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Innocents Beware:
Has Bennis v. Michigan
Made Asset Forfeiture Too Easy?
"The better the society, the less law there will be. In Heaven
there will be no law, and the lion will lie down with the lamb.
The values of an unjust society will reflect themselves in an unjust
law. The worse the society, the more law there will be. In Hell
there will be nothing but law, and due process will be
meticulously observed."'
I. INTRODUCTION

The War on Crime is claiming more victims. This time, the victims are
the owners of property who are unlucky enough to have had their property
used in the commission of the crime. This victimization occurs because
asset forfeiture, a weapon that has long been in the government's crimefighting arsenal, has become increasingly popular with both law enforcement
agencies and legislatures. Historically, the use of asset forfeiture has been
limited to areas vital enough to justify its harshness. More recently,
however, asset forfeiture has been used to deter and punish crimes much
different from its historical analogs. This use is an attack on the rights of
property owners that freedom-loving Americans should not ignore.
Asset forfeiture is a legal concept that finds its roots in the Bible.'
The idea can be traced through English common law. The United States has
accepted it as an appropriate method of dealing with smugglers, pirates, and
evaders of revenue laws. 3 Recently, it has been used in an attempt to stem
the traffic in illicit drugs4 and reduce the occurrence of other intractable
crimes. The advantages of appeal,5 its relative ease, and the revenue that
forfeiture makes available have made it quite popular with law enforcement
agencies.6

1. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 111 (1977).
2. LEONARD W. LEVY, A LICENSE TO STEAL 7 (1996) (referring to Exodus 21:28,
which demands the stoning of any animal that has killed a human).
3. Id. at 44-45.
4. DAVID B. SMITH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE CASES 1-7 (1990).

5. In civil forfeiture cases, the government has the right to appeal an "acquittal," an
advantage that simply does not exist in criminal cases. Id. at 12-63.
6. LEVY, supra note 2, at 1.
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This casenote will discuss the roots of asset forfeiture. Section II of
this note discusses the historical justifications of asset forfeiture as well as
its more recent uses. Section III is divided into two parts. Section IIIA will
provide the factual background of Bennis v. Michigan,' and Section IIIB
will discuss the procedural history of the case. Section IV is divided into
a three-part analysis. Section IVA will trace the reasoning of the majority
opinion to its conclusion. Section IVB is this author's analysis of the
strength and weaknesses of the opinion. It will demonstrate how the
Supreme Court's decision in Bennis has severed asset forfeiture from its
historical underpinnings and will allow for it to be used in ways that violate
the Constitutional safeguards of due process. Section IVC argues that the
practical impact of the Supreme Court's Bennis decision will be a further
erosion of civil liberties as overzealous law enforcement officers attempt to
seize property.
i.

HISTORY

Asset forfeiture has a venerable history and has taken many forms. It
has been used in criminal and civil proceedings for deterrent, remedial and
punitive reasons. Since the various permutations of asset forfeiture have
different purposes and justifications, any discussion of asset forfeiture should
be narrowly focused. The scope of this historical background will be
limited to the concept of civil asset forfeiture.'
Civil forfeiture is a proceeding in rem.9 Since in an in rem proceeding, the property is the defendant, courts have officially considered the guilt
or innocence of the property's owner to be irrelevant.' ° Unofficially,

7. 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
8. Fortunately the more bizarre forms of forfeiture, such as the English Common Law
Deodand, never took hold in the United States. See Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate, 188 S.W. 54
(Tenn. 1916) (Tennessee Constitution of 1870 expressly rejects deodands). "A deodand is a
thing forfeited, presumably to God for the good of the community, but in reality to the
English Crown." LEVY, supra note 2, at 7.
Inanimate objects causing death were forfeited to the English Crown as deodands.
For a more thorough discussion of this concept, including its basis in superstition and
religious expiation, see OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 7 (1881).
9. Christine M. Durkin, Note, Civil Forfeiture Under Federal Narcotics Law, 24
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 680-681 (1990).

10. In rem proceedings existed at least as early as Mosaic law. See J.W. Goldsmith,
Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921) (Mosaic law inflicted punishment
like forfeiture in certain cases).
The notion that chattel may be the defendant in a case stems from the Biblical rule
that "[w]hen an ox gore a man or a woman to death, the ox must be stoned; its flesh may not
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however, the courts viewed the owner as being culpable" or the forfeiture
as otherwise necessary. 2 Admiralty treated property as the offender
because the admiralty courts viewed an in rem proceeding as the only
effective method of stopping smuggling or piracy. 3 The courts were also
willing to indulge the legislative tendency to employ forfeiture to enforce
the revenue laws.' 4
One of the first Supreme Court cases to recognize the injustice of
punishing an innocent owner was United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee. 5
The case involved the illegal importation of coffee.' 6 After the commission of the offense, but prior to its seizure, the coffee was sold to a bona
fide purchaser. 7 The Court faced the dilemma of determining when title
of forfeited property vested in the Sovereign. If title vested at the moment
of the illegal act, injustice to innocent parties might result. But if title
vested only upon actual seizure, the intent of the law might be circumvented
by an interim transfer of title to another party. In a one-page majority
opinion, the Court upheld the forfeiture based on statutory interpretation. 8
The dissent, however, vigorously protested.' 9 The dissent stated that basic
notions of fairness required that "fictions of law shall not be permitted to

be eaten." See United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869, 872 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Exodus
21:28) (excellent discussion of the foundations of in rem forfeiture proceedings).
11. "As Blackstone put it, 'such misfortunes are in part owing to the negligence of the
owner, and therefore he is properly punished by such forfeiture."' Austin v. United States,
509 U.S. 602, 611 (1993) (quoting I BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 291 (Dawsons of Pall
Mall 1966) (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1765)).
12. Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233 (1844) ("And this is done
from the necessity of the case.").
13. "It is not an uncommon course in the admiralty,. . . to treat the vessel.., as the
offender, without any regard whatsoever to the personal misconduct or responsibility of the
owner thereof. And this is done from the necessity of the case, as the only adequate means
of suppressing the offence or wrong . .

. ."

Id.

14. "Forfeitures in rem which the legislature has provided to guard the revenue laws
from abuse." United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398, 406 (1814)
(Story, J. dissenting).
15. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398 (1814).
16. Id.

17. Id. at 401.
18. Id. at 404. Perhaps, this case is more important for its discussion of the "relation
back" doctrine. This concept vests the title of the illegally used property in the sovereign at
the moment of its illegal use. The Court recognized the harshness of the doctrine, but found
it necessary lest "if by a sale it is put in the power of an offender to purge a forfeiture, a
state of things not less absurd will certainly result from it." Id. at 405.
19. Id. (Story, J., dissenting) (joined by two other Justices) ("[T]he discussion in this
[C]ourt has not increased my confidence").
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work any wrong"2 and that very little reliance should be "placed upon
analogies borrowed from the feudal tenures . . ., Although recognizing
the dilemmas posed by its position, the dissent stated that it would have
refused to reinstate the forfeiture.22

In The Palmyra,23 the Court more directly confronted the issue of an

innocent owner. The Palmyra, a Spanish flagged vessel, attacked two
war ship. 24
American ships and was eventually captured by a United States
The vessel was then seized under the authority of The Piracy Act of 1891.25
The owner objected on the grounds that at common law "no rights to the
goods and chattels of the felon could be acquired by the crown by the mere

commission of the offence, but rather that the right attached only by the

conviction of the offender."' 6 The Court rejected the owner's argument that
27
the vessel could not be forfeited until he was convicted of privateering.
The Court rested its decision on the distinction between criminal and civil
forfeiture.28 It held that in admiralty, as well as on the revenue side of the
Exchequer, a conviction of the property owner was not necessary because
"[t]he thing here is primarily considered as the offender ....29

20. Id. at 415 (Story, J., dissenting).
dissenting).
21. Id. at 413 (Story, J.,
22. The dissent recognized the right of the United States to engage in forfeiture and
that forfeiture attached to a thing. However, it viewed the government as only possessing
inchoate title. "That against the offender or his representatives, upon seizure or suit, the title,
by operation of law, relates back to the time of the offence, so as to avoid all mesne acts; but
as to a bona fide purchaser, for valuable consideration, and without notice of the offence, the
doctrine of relation does not apply so as to divest his legitimate title." 1960 Bags of Coffee,
12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 416 (Story, J., dissenting).
23. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
24. Id. at 2.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 14.
27. T7he Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 12-13.
28. Id. at 14.
29. The Court was extremely careful to note the difference between forfeitures used
as punishment and those forfeitures allowed under the revenue and admiralty laws. "In the
contemplation of the common law, the offender's right was not divested, until the conviction.
But this doctrine never was applied to seizures and forfeitures created by statute, in rem,
cognisable on the revenue side of the exchequer . . . .The same principle applies to
proceedings in rem, on seizures in the Admiralty." Id. Later in the opinion, the Court more
directly indicates that civil forfeitures should be limited to cases involving admiralty and
revenue laws. "In the judgment of this Court, no personal conviction of the offender is
necessary to, enforce a forfeiture in rem in casesof this nature." Id. at 15 (emphasis added).

1997]

ASSET FORFEITURE AFTER BENNIS

Nearly twenty years later the Court reiterated The Palmyra holding in
Harmony v. United States." This case also involved piracy on the high
seas, but the prosecution stipulated as to the innocence of the vessel's
owners.3 1 The owners of the Brig Malek Adhel had authorized "an
innocent commercial voyage. 2 During the voyage, however, the commander and crew engaged in acts of aggression and piracy against other
vessels. 3 Based on the allegations of piracy, the ship was seized. 4
Despite the innocence of the owners the Court upheld the forfeiture, but
stressed that it viewed it as a necessity in admiralty cases. 35 The Court
also repeated that this doctrine was applicable "to cases of smuggling and
other misconduct under our revenue laws., 36 In an interesting piece of
dictum, the Court stated that the harsh penalty of forfeiture should only be
applied to gross violations of the admiralty laws and that "the infliction of
any forfeiture beyond this does not seem to be pressed by any considerations
3
derived from public law.

1

This notion of allowing forfeiture of property involved in the violation
of admiralty or revenue laws, regardless of the innocence or guilt of the
owner, was repeated through the turn of the century. 3
Forfeiture for
violation of prohibition era liquor laws was also allowed when it involved
smuggling and violation of revenue laws. 9 The principles justifying these
holdings were expressly stated in J W Goldsmith, Jr.-GrantCo. v. United
States.4 ° The Goldsmith Court was faced with the task of deciding whether
a seller's interest in a car could be forfeited based on the purchaser's use of
the car to smuggle bootleg liquor in violation of the applicable revenue
statutes.4'

30. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844). Some sources also refer to this case as Brig Malek

Adhel v. United States.

31. Id. at 211.
32. Id. at 230.
33. Id. at 232.
34. Harmony, 43 U.S. at 211.
35. "And this is done from the necessity of the case, as the only adequate means of
suppressingthe offence or wrong, or insuring an indemnity to the injured party." Id. at 233.
36. Id.

37. Id. at 236.

38. E.g., United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1 (1890).
39. "It has long been settled that statutory forfeitures of property entrusted by the
innocent owner or lienor to another who uses it in violation of the revenuelaws of the United
States is not a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Van Oster v.
Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 468 (1926) (emphasis added).
40. 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
41. Id. at 508 (seller's interest in this case is the lien used as security for the car loan).
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. The Grant Company, an automobile dealer, had sold the car,42 but was
retaining title until the purchase price was paid in full."' Subsequently, the
buyer of the car used it in violation of the revenue laws." The case went
to the jury on the stipulated fact that the vehicle was illegally used without
the knowledge of the Grant Company."5 The car was found guilty and a
judgment of forfeiture was entered against it.46 On appeal, the Supreme
Court upheld the forfeiture of the innocent seller's interest, but expressly
reserved the question of whether forfeiture could extend to "property stolen
from the owner or otherwise taken from him without his privity or
' The Court reasoned that those property owners who voluntarily
consent."47
surrendered their property to a wrongdoer were guilty of some amount of
negligence and deservedly punished. 8 Interestingly, despite the fact that
the case involved a violation of the revenue laws and the weight of
precedent supporting its position, the Court felt it necessary to justify its
holding.4
In the modem era, Congress has utilized forfeiture as a weapon in the
War on Drugs. In 1970, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug
Prevention and Control Act,5" which is codified as part of the Controlled
Substances Act for the seizure of drug-related assets. State enactment of
comparable statutes soon followed."'
The validity of one such statute was questioned in Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. 2 The statute in question, "P.R. Laws Ann.,
Tit. 24, section 2512(a) (Supp. 1973), [was] modeled after 21 U.S.C. section
881(a)."53 This statute, however, did not also include an innocent owner

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 509.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Goldsmith, 254 U.S. at 509.
Id. at 512.

48. Id. at 511.

49. "Congress must have taken into account the necessitiesof the government, its
revenues and policies, and was faced with the necessity of making provision against their

violation or evasion and the ways and means of violation or evasion." Id. at 510 (emphasis
added).
50. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-

513, § 511, 84 Stat. 1276 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1976, Supp. 11 1978, & Supp. III
1979)).
51. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4,305, 4311 (West Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 893.12 (West 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-49 (1996).
52. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
53. Id. at 686-87 n.25.
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defense.

4

The Calero-Toledo case involved the seizure of a yacht from

a leasing company."

The lessees of the yacht were caught with marijuana

on board and charged with violation of the Controlled Substances Act of
Puerto Rico and the yacht was seized. 6 The owners first learned of the

seizure when they attempted to repossess the yacht. 7

The Court upheld the forfeiture and the applicable Puerto Rican statutes

by likening the situation to smuggling." The majority reasoned that "[t]o
the extent that such forfeiture provisions are applied to lessors, bailors, or

secured creditors who are innocent of any wrongdoing, confiscation may
have the desirable effect of inducing them to exercise greater care in
' The Court, however,
transferring possession of their property."59
acknowl-

edged that in other circumstances a forfeiture of this type could "give rise
to serious constitutional questions." '

The Court in Austin v. United States6 ' found one of these serious
constitutional questions to be whether the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment could serve as a limit to in rem civil forfeiture

proceedings. The Court answered the question in the affirmative.62

Austin involved the forfeiture of the criminal defendant's home and auto
body shop.63 The defendant had pled guilty to one count of possessing

54. Id. at 694.
55. Id. at 663.

56. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 665.
57. Id. at 668.

58. "Plainly, the Puerto Rican forfeiture statutes further the punitive and deterrent
purposes that have been found sufficient to uphold, against constitutional challenge, the
application of other forfeiture statutes to the property of innocents. " Id. at 686.
59. Id. at 687-688.
60. "[T]he broad sweep of forfeiture statutes... [could], in other circumstances, give
rise to serious constitutional questions." Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689.
The Court further stated:
"[In the situation] of an owner who proved not only that he was
uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had
done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of
his property; for, in that circumstance, it would be difficult to conclude that
forfeiture served legitimate purposes and was not unduly oppressive."
Id. at 689-90.
61. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
62. Austin, 509 U.S. at 622.
63. Id. at 604. The government seized both pieces of property because both pieces
were "involved" in the drug transaction. The purchaser of the drugs met Austin at his body
shop, where they finalized the details of the transaction. Austin then retrieved the illegal
drugs from his mobile home and returned to his body shop, where the transaction was
consumated. Id. at 605.
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cocaine with the intent to distribute.64 The United States then filed an in
rem action against the defendant's home and auto body shop.65 The
government justified this action because Austin, the defendant, had brought
the cocaine from his home to the body shop in order to sell it.66 According
to the government, this constituted "use" of those properties to facilitate a
drug-related crime.67 The Court accepted Austin's contention that civil
forfeitures are subject to the Excessive Fines Clause.6" The Court reasoned
that some provisions of the Bill of Rights were expressly limited to criminal
cases.69 The Eighth Amendment, however, does not expressly contain such
a limitation. Also, the Court found that the history of the Eighth Amendment
does not support the conclusion that such a limitation should be read into the
Amendment.7 ° Therefore, the Court refused to hold that the Eighth
Amendment's application was limited to only criminal cases.7
Since the defendant argued only that the forfeiture would violate the
Eighth Amendment and the statute involved had an "innocent owner"
defense, the Court did not need to decide the issue of forfeiture regarding
"innocent owners."72 The Court, however, recognized that its precedent in
the area of forfeiture was justified in each case on the notion that the
individual owner was somehow culpable. 3
Austin seemed to indicate a willingness on the part of the Court to
question the vitality of civil forfeiture proceedings. The Court strengthened
this implication just months later in United States v. James Daniel Good

64. Id. at 602.

65. Id. The United States made a motion for summary judgment. Austin's answer

included his Eighth Amendment claim, but the District Court rejected this argument and
granted summary judgment for the United States. Id. at 605.
66. Austin, 509 U.S. at 602.
67. Id.

68. Id. at 622.
69. Id. at 607-08. The Court reasoned that when the framers of the Constitution wished
to limit the application of a certain right, they did so by express language. The Court
specifically mentioned the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause: "No person...
shall be compelled in any criminalcase to be a witness against himself," and noted that the
protections of the Sixth Amendment are expressly limited to "criminal prosecutions." Id.
(emphasis added).
70. Austin, 509 U.S. at 608.
71. Id.

72. Id. at 617. "Because the forfeiture provisions at issue here exempt 'innocent

owners,' we again have no occasion to decide in this case whether it would comport with due

process to forfeit the property of a truly innocent owner." Id. at 617 n.10.
73. "Both theories rest, at bottom, on the notion that the owner has been negligent in
allowing his property to be misused and that he is properly punished for that negligence."
Id. at 615. Accord Peisch v. Ware, 2 L. Ed. 347 (1808).
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Real Property.74 In James Daniel Good, the defendant pled guilty to drug
charges." Four and one half years later, the United States seized the
defendant's house "on the ground that the property had been used to commit
or facilitate the commission of a federal drug offense. '76 The government
seized the home without any prior notice to its owner. 7' The defendant
objected on the ground that he was not afforded the due process guaranteed
by the Fifth Amendment.7" The Court agreed and held that due process
required a meaningful opportunity to be heard prior to seizure.79
While the holding in James Daniel Good makes the forfeiture process
only slightly more difficult for the government, the Court's opinion is
important in other respects. First, the Court noted that it had rationalized
its precedent in the forfeiture arena on a finding of urgency." Second,
admitting that the rules regulating forfeiture proceedings had their origins
in admiralty cases, 8 the Court re-evaluated their necessity and application
in modem times. 2 Even the dissent admitted that in a proper case reevaluation of civil forfeiture might be proper.83

74. 114 S.Ct. 492 (1993).
75. Id. at 495.
76. Id. at 497. The government's argument that this property was "involved" in a drug
offense seems a bit stronger than this same argument in Austin. At the time of their search,
Hawaiian police officers discovered about 89 pounds of marijuana hidden in Good's home.
Id.
77. Id. at 498. To many observers, this case signaled a sea change in the Court's
attitude towards forfeiture because, ironically, it seems to be relatively free of any abusive
government action. Austin, at the time of the seizure, was renting his home to tenants. The
government did not evict the tenants, but rather allowed them to continue occupying the
premises provided they paid their rent directly to the United States Marshal. Id.
78. James Daniel Good, 114 S. Ct. at 498.
79. The Court noted that pre-notice seizures were justifiable only to preserve the
Court's jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that prior notice was especially appropriate in the
case of real property "[b]ecause real property cannot abscond, the court's jurisdiction can be
preserved without prior seizure." Id. at 503.
80. "Without revisiting these cases, it suffices to say that their apparent rationale- like
that for allowing summary seizures during wartime, and seizures of contaminated food- was
one of executive urgency." Id. at 504 (citations omitted). The Court explained that since by
1902, nearly 75 percent of federal revenues were based on liquor, customs, and tobacco taxes
"the very existence of government depends upon prompt collection of revenues." Id. (quoting
G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352 n.18 (1977)).
81. James Daniel Good, 114 S. Ct. at 503.
82. Id. (finding that while there were valid reasons for denying pre-seizure hearings
in admiralty, the Court could not find any justifiable reasons in the instant case).
83. Id. at 515 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Given that
current practice under [federal forfeiture statutes] appears to be far removed from the legal
fiction upon which the civil forfeiture doctrine is based, it may be necessary - in an
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Just three years later, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to decide
Bennis v. Michigan, a case that required the Court to directly confront the
issue of an innocent owner's property being forfeited. In addition, in the
Bennis case, the urgencies of the admiralty setting arguably did not exist.
8 4
III. HISTORY OF BENNIS V. MICHIGAN

A. CASE FACTS

The arrest of John Bennis, the husband of the petitioner, is the starting
point for this case. Prior to Bennis's arrest, Detroit police officers had set
up a surveillance of a woman they believed to be a prostitute. 5 Eventually, the officers witnessed a 1977 Pontiac stop and pick up this woman.86
The officers monitored this vehicle until they noticed that the woman's
head had disappeared. 7 As the officers approached the vehicle they
observed the woman performing fellatio on the car's driver."8
The driver of the car, John Bennis, was charged and convicted of gross
indecency. 9 Following this conviction, the prosecutor initiated abatement
proceedings against the Bennis vehicle alleging it was a public nuisance.9 °
The trial judge agreed and abated the vehicle.9 '
The vehicle, a 1977 Pontiac, was jointly owned by John Bennis and his
wife Tina.92 Tina Bennis claimed that she had no knowledge that her
husband would use the vehicle to violate the applicable statute.93 Ironically, Mrs. Bennis was so concerned about her husband's tardiness on the night
of the incident that she called the police to report him missing.94

appropriate case - to reevaluate our generally deferential approach to legislative judgments
in the area of civil forfeiture.")
84. 116 S.Ct. 994 (1996).
85. Michigan exrel. Wayne County Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483,486 (Mich.
1994). The officers had noticed the woman "flagging," i.e., attempting to solicit business
from passing cars. Id.

86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Michigan ex rel. Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney v. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d 731,

732 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).

90. Id.

91. Id.
92. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S.Ct. 994, 996 (1996).
93. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 486. (The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the record

did not support a finding that Mrs. Bennis knew the vehicle was being used in an illegal
manner.) 504 N.W.2d at 732.
94. Bennis, 116 S.Ct. at 1008.
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B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

After John Bennis's conviction for gross indecency, the Circuit Court
of Wayne County, Michigan instituted proceedings to abate the Bennis's
vehicle as a nuisance pursuant to the applicable Michigan statute. 95 The
Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the abatement on several grounds: first,
the prosecution was obligated to demonstrate that Mrs. Bennis knew of the
use of the vehicle as a nuisance; 96 second, the very nature of a nuisance is
that it is a repetitive act and the prosecution had failed to prove that the
vehicle was involved in more than one incident of lewdness; 97 and third,
the applicable statute is confined to acts of prostitution and absent proof of
an exchange of money, his conduct was not lewd in the statutory sense. 98
The Supreme Court of Michigan reversed on all three grounds. On the
proof of knowledge issue, the court held that its earlier common law
requirement of knowledge had been abrogated by statute. 99 Regarding the
failure to allege more than a single instance of lewdness, the court reasoned
that the statute referred to the vehicle and the neighborhood combined. The
neighborhood was notorious for prostitution and the Bennis's vehicle was
"thereby contribut[ing] to an existing condition that is a public nuisance."' 0 0 The court also held that in the totality of the circumstances, an
act of prostitution did occur and the conduct alleged was squarely within the
purview of the statute.'0 The court assumed the innocence of the petitioner, 02 but concluded that United States Supreme Court precedent did not
require an innocent owner defense0 3 and that the issue was "without
4
constitutional consequence." 10

95. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d at 732. The applicable statute states: "Any building, vehicle,

boat, aircraft or place used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution ... is
hereby declared a nuisance and ... shall be enjoined and abated." MICH. COMP. LAWS §
600.3801 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996).
96. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d at 732.
97. Id. at 733.
98. Id. at 735.
99. Michigan ex rel.Wayne County Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483,493 (Mich.

1994). The court referred to M.C.L. § 600.3815(2) which states: "Proof of knowledge of the
existence of the nuisance on the part of the defendants or any of them, shall not be required."
MICH. COMp. LAWS § 600.3815(2) (West 1987).
100. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 491.
101. Id.

102. Id. at 493.
103. Id. at 495.
104. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 494 (citing Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926);
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974)).
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From a constitutional viewpoint, the failure to require knowledge was
troubling and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.' °5
IV. ANALYSIS
A. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION

Chief Justice Rehnquist began the 5-4 majority opinion by stating that
a "long and unbroken line of cases holds that an owner's interest in property
may be forfeited by reason of the use to which the property is put even
though the owner did not know that it was to be put to such use."'0 6 The
Court noted that in its earliest opinion on this issue it held that, in admiralty,
conviction of the owner was not necessary to subject the property to
forfeiture because the "offence is attached primarily to the thing."'0 7 The
Court emphasized this point by citing another admiralty case which held that
where a ship is in violation of statute, the owner's interest in the ship is
18
subject to forfeiture regardless of whether the owner is innocent.
The Court also cited two cases where property was forfeited for
violation of the revenue laws. The Court repeated the holding of Dobbin's
Distillery v. United States.'" The Dobbin's Court stated that where an
owner entrusts possession of his property to another, the acts of the
possessor will bind the property (and its owner) and subject the property to
forfeiture regardless of whether the property's owner was a party to any
wrongdoing." 0 The Court then attempted to justify this apparent harshness. The Court emphasized it is not "uncommon for the law to visit upon
the owner of property the unpleasant consequences of the unauthorized
action [because] certain uses of property may be regarded as so undesirable
that the owner surrenders his control at his peril."'' . The Court remarked
that even as early as 1921, the Court concluded that forfeiture schemes that
disregarded the innocence of the owner were "too firmly fixed in the
105. Bennis v. Michigan, 115 S. Ct. 2275 (1995).
106. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 998 (1996).
107. Id. (quoting The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827)).
108. "[T]he interest of the owner of the ship, whether he be innocent or guilty is
[subject to forfeiture]." Id. (quoting Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233
(1844)).
109. 96 U.S. (6 Otto) 395 (1878).
110. "Cases often arise where the property of the owner is forfeited on account of the
... misconduct of those intrusted with its possession,.., and it has always been held...
that the acts of [the possessors] bind the interest of the owner ... whether he be innocent or
guilty." Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998 (quoting Dobbin's Distillery,96 U.S. at 401).
111. Id. (quoting Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467 (1926)).

1997]

ASSET FORFEITURE AFTER BENNIS

punitive 2and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now dis'
placed." "
The Court also noted that in its most recent decision on point, CaleroToledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 3 it had rejected the innocent
owner defense."
The Court stated that the petitioner's reliance on
Calero-Toledo was misplaced because the language favorable to the
petitioner's cause was dictum." ' The Court stated that the holding of
Calero-Toledo was that the owner's interest in property could be forfeited
despite the owner's ignorance of and lack of involvement in the criminal
activity. 1l6
The Court went on to reject the dissent's interpretation of precedent.1"' The dissent had argued that forfeitures that disregarded the
owner's innocence were based on cases where the illegal activity had been
the principal use of the property."' The majority rejected this interpretation stating that "this Court's precedent has never made the due process
inquiry depend on whether the use for which the instrumentality was
forfeited was the principal use.""..9 The majority also stated that the
dissent's ad absurdem arguments would be dealt with as they arose. 2 °
The Court then dealt directly with the innocent owner argument raised
by the petitioner. The Court stated that accepting the petitioner's argument
would amount to overruling its case law in this area by "importing a
culpability requirement from cases having at best a tangential relation to the
'innocent-owner' doctrine in forfeiture cases."'' The two cases that the
Court dismissed as only tangentially related were Foucha v. Louisiana'2 2
and Austin v. United States.12
112. Id. at 999 (quoting J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505,
511 (1921)).
113. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
114. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999.
115. Id. (The petitioner had relied on the language stating "it would be difficult to reject
the constitutional claim of... an owner who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and
unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be
expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property.") Calero-Toledo,416 U.S. at 689.
116. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689 (1974).
117. Bennis, 116 S.Ct. at 999.
118. Id.at 1005.
119. Id.at 999-1000.
120. Id.at 1000. (The majority refers to the dissent's suggestion that the majority
holding "would justify the confiscation of an ocean liner because one of its passengers sinned
while on board." Bennis, 116 S.Ct. at 1005 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
121. Id.
122. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
123. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
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Fouchadealt with detention of criminal defendants found not guilty by
reason of insanity. The Court there concluded that the State must possess
a punitive interest to justify continued detention. 2 The Bennis Court
denied Foucha's applicability because "Foucha did not purport to discuss,
let alone overrule, The Palmyra line of cases. '25
The central holding of Austin was that "forfeiture . . . constitutes
payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense and, as such, is
subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fine
Clause."'2 6 The Court found that Austin was not on point because it did
not deal with an innocent owner defense.' 27
The Court then justified forfeiture on its deterrent aspects.'
The
Court stated that forfeiture prevents the "further illicit use of the [property]
and ... render[s] illegal behavior unprofitable."' 29 Forfeiture also serves
to preclude "evasions by dispensing with the necessity of judicial inquiry as
to collusion between the wrongdoer and the alleged innocent owner."' 13
The Court then concluded that Mrs. Bennis had not made a showing
greater than any of the Court's earlier cases upholding forfeiture and denied
the relief requested.'
Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion,'

124. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80.
125. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000.
126. Austin, 509 U.S. at 622.
127. Bennis, at 1000.
128. The Court compared the deterrent affect of Michigan's abatement scheme to
another Michigan law making an automobile owner liable for any negligent driving
committed by anyone who had the owner's permission to drive it. Id.
The Court failed to explain how someone will be deterred by consequences of which
they are unaware. The law may be able to presume that an automobile owner can determine
whether or not the person to whom they are loaning their car is inebriated. The presumption,
however, appears to be much weaker regarding the automobile owner's potential knowledge
of prostitution use. It is hard to imagine that many people would loan their car to someone
knowing that it was going to be the locus of an illicit rendezvous.
129. Id. (quoting Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 687).
130. Id. at 1000-01 (quoting Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 467-68).
131. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1001 (1996).
132. Justice Thomas's concurrence suggested that since the "use" of property in a crime
was the limit to forfeiture application, "use" should be defined carefully. Justice Thomas also
stated that "[t]his case is ultimately a reminder that the Federal Constitution does not prohibit
everything that is intensely undesirable."Id. at 1001-02 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
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as did Justice Ginsburg.133 Both of these opinions firmly supported the
reasoning of the-majority opinion.
B. DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS OF BENNIS v. MICHIGAN

The Supreme Court, while holding that no violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause occurred, did not engage in any independent due process analysis. The Court analogized the Bennis situation to
earlier admiralty and revenue cases.' 34 Uncritical acceptance of those
analogies leads inexorably to the same conclusion the Court reached.
Dispensing with that analogy, however, and conducting a serious analysis
of the Bennis facts in light of the Court's earlier Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence will find that Michigan's abatement scheme seriously violates
constitutional safeguards. 3
The analogy the Court made to its precedents should not be accepted
as a substitute for a substantive due process analysis for two reasons. First,
analogies to admiralty and revenue precedent are inappropriate because their
justifying rationale - that the absence of other means of punishment and
deterrence makes the use of asset forfeiture a necessity - is inapplicable
where the Offender is known and available. Second, the Court laid the
foundation for its analogy with precedents that were decided well before the
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment and any recognition that it or the
36
Fifth Amendment contained a substantive component.'

133. Justice Ginsburg seemed to take a practical view of the matter. Noting that the car
in question was only valued at $600 and that the forfeiture proceeding was an equitable
action, Justice Ginsburg implied that trial judges could be trusted to police the more
egregious forfeitures. Id. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
134. For example, the Court cited The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827), an
admiralty case, and Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926), a revenue case.
135. This analysis will be conducted under the premise that a government in a free
society will not be permitted to operate in an irrational or unjust manner. The Supreme
Court accepts this premise:
It does not at all follow that every statute enacted ostensibly for the
promotion of these ends [public health, safety or morals], is to be accepted
as a legitimate exertion of the police powers of the State. There are, of
necessity, limits beyond which legislation cannot rightfully go .... [T]he
courts must obey the Constitution rather than the law-making department
of government, and must, upon their own responsibility, determine whether,
in any particular case, these limits have been passed.
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
136. The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, but it took almost another twenty
years for the Court to recognize that it contained substantive protections. The Court made
this recognition in 1887:
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The ability, indeed the obligation, of the Supreme Court to review the
substance of laws was recognized by some of the Court's earliest justices. 37 Proponents of the natural law philosophy upon which our government was founded contended that arbitrary and irrational acts of government
should not be sustained.'38 Substantive due process analysis is one of the
doctrinal tools the Court has previously used to invalidate irrational and
arbitrary laws.
Substantive due process analysis requires a determination whether the
law being challenged is infringing on a fundamental right. If the Court
determines that a fundamental right is being abrogated, it strictly scrutinizes
the law to ascertain its validity.' 39 The Court reviews non-fundamental
rights under an extremely deferential "mere rationality" test. In most cases,

The courts are not bound by mere forms, nor are they to be misled by mere
pretences. They are at liberty - indeed, are under a solemn duty - to
look at the substance of things, whenever they enter upon the inquiry
whether the legislature has transcended the limits of its authority. If,
therefore, a statute ...is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the
fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give
effect to the Constitution.
Id. The Court's recognition of substantive due process safeguards in 1887 explains why a
similarly worded Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause did not afford those protections in
The Palmyra (decided in 1827), the Harmony (decided in 1844), or 1960 Bags of Coffee
(decided in 1814).
137. Justice Chase argued that natural law and reason prevented a grant of absolute
power to the legislature. He stated that people entered into society to protect their rights in
their persons and property. Invasions of those rights could not be allowed because they were
destructive of society. From this belief Justice Chase reasoned that "[t]here are acts which
the Federal, or State Legislature cannot do, without exceeding their authority." Calder v.
Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798).
138. Interestingly, most of the irrational acts that aggravated our founders dealt with
deprivations of property or the punishment of innocents:
A law that punished a citizen for an innocent action, or, in other words, for
an act, which, when done, was in violation of no existing law; a law that
destroys or impairs, the lawful private contracts of citizens; a law that
makes a man a judge in his own cause; a law that takes property from A.
and gives it to B: it is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust
a Legislature with such powers; and therefore, it cannot be presumed that
they have done it .... [The legislature] may command what is right, and
prohibit what is wrong; but they cannot change innocence into guilt; or
punish innocence as a crime; or violate ... the right of private property.
Id.
139. "The nature of the right invaded is pertinent, to be sure, for statutes regulating
sensitive areas of liberty do, under the cases of this Court, require 'strict scrutiny' and must
be viewed in light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose." Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 503-04 (1965) (White, J., concurring).
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this determination is vital to the disposition of the case. As one commentator has noted, a decision by the Court to use the "mere rationality" test
amounts to "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact,"'"4
while strict scrutiny amounts to scrutiny that is "strict in theory and fatal in
fact.' 4' It is this author's contention, however, that Michigan's abatement
scheme fails either test.
Strict scrutiny requires that the interest the State is pursuing be a
compelling one.'42 The Court also examines the means used to accomplish the State's objective. If the Court finds that the State could have
achieved its objective in a manner less destructive of personal liberties, the
law will be found unconstitutional.' 43
The objective of Michigan's abatement scheme is clearly to deter and
reduce prostitution in areas that have been plagued by its commission. It is
not denied that the State can legitimately regulate the behavior of its citizens
within the constraints of its police powers. This interest can even be
elevated to the level of compelling when some of its citizens are so
threatened by criminal activities that it impacts the conduct of their daily
lives. It can even be conceded that the State of Michigan has a duty to
conduct more intensive law enforcement efforts where criminal conduct is
more flagrant.' 44
Granting that Michigan has a compelling interest in reducing prostitution in crime ravaged neighborhoods, however, does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that Michigan's abatement scheme is constitutional.
Michigan has other law enforcement tools at its disposal that are potentially
just as effective as its current scheme. In cases similar to the Bennis
situation, Michigan can choose to punish the guilty party more severely.
This could include, if Michigan insists, seizure of any property owned by the
140. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
141. Id.

142. "Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may
prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling." Bates v. City of
Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
143. This "means" part of the strict scrutiny review is often more difficult
for the
government to meet. The Court requires that the law "will be upheld only if it is necessary,
and not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy."

McLaughlin v. Florida., 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (emphasis added) (sometimes courts refer

to this requirement as the most narrowly tailored means).

144. Mr. Bennis was apprehended in a residential neighborhood that had a reputation
for prostitution and other criminal activity. Michigan ex rel. Wayne County Prosecutor v.

Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 488 (Mich. 1994).
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offender that was used in the commission of the crime. Michigan could also
choose to punish the offender with prison. The existence of these alternatives indicates that the seizure of an innocent person's property is not vital
to the success of Michigan's anti-prostitution efforts. If reviewed under a
strict scrutiny standard, therefore, Michigan's attempt to reduce prostitution
should be held unconstitutional because the means Michigan employs are
not necessary to the achievement of its objective.
Assuming, arguendo, that the right to own property is not a fundamental right, Michigan's abatement scheme still violates the deferential scrutiny
given by the "mere rationality" test. This test would only require Michigan
to pursue a legitimate governmental objective with means that are rationally
related to the achievement of that objective. 45
Michigan's objectives, reduction and deterrence of prostitution, are
unarguably within the police powers that it possesses to protect the health,
safety, welfare and morality of its citizens. Michigan's abatement scheme
does not fail because its objective is illegitimate, rather it fails because it
does not meet the second requirement: rationality. Any policy which tends
to encourage or fails to discourage the very acts that the policy condemns
is, by definition, irrational. Michigan's abatement scheme meets this
definition.
Currently, Michigan's penal code makes the solicitation of a prostitute
a misdemeanor, 46 punishable by a fine of one hundred dollars or ninety
days imprisonment or both. 47 Michigan does not treat solicitation as a
felony until it obtains a third conviction. 4 ' Apparently, it must be
difficult to prove that a male has engaged the services of a prostitute or the
4 is more effective since Mr.
deterrent effect of a gross indecency charge
150
Bennis was charged with gross indecency.
Since Michigan does not consider the act of sexual intercourse grossly
indecent' the combined effect of these laws allows for results bordering
on the absurd. For example, a man borrows his girlfriend's car, uses the car
to engage a prostitute in normal sexual intercourse in the car's rear seat, and
is caught in flagrante delicto by the police. Under Michigan law, if the

145. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1937).
146. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.449a (West 1987).
147. § 750.451 (West 1987).
148. § 750.451 (West 1987).
149. Michigan treats gross indecency as a felony and allows for punishments of up to
five years of prison or fines up to $2,500. § 750.338b (West 1987).
150. Michigan ex rel. Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney v. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d 731,
732 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
151. People v. Danielac, 195 N.W.2d 922 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972).

1997]

ASSET FORFEITURE AFTER BENNIS

prostitution charge is proven, the boyfriend can only be fined one hundred
dollars and sentenced to ninety days in the county jail since by the nature
of the act (normal sexual intercourse), the boyfriend has not committed
gross indecency. The girlfriend, however, whose only offense is possession
of judgment poor enough to be dating such a scoundrel, can be punished
severely by the forfeiture of her car."' In these situations, Michigan's
choice of punishment does not discourage the offense, but makes its
commission relatively free of punishment to the offender. This can hardly
be considered a rational result if one is sincerely wishing to punish the
participants of the illegal act.
Michigan's use of asset forfeiture to deter and punish prostitution fails
strict scrutiny because there are alternatives less destructive of personal
property rights. It also fails deferential scrutiny because, as applied, it can
lead to the manifest injustice of punishing the innocent, while allowing the
guilty to escape with the equivalent of a slap on the wrist.
C. PRACTICAL IMPACT

Many states have had asset forfeiture laws for several years. Since
many of these states modeled their forfeiture laws after the federal
government's asset forfeiture law, most include innocent owner defenses and
most only apply to drug related offenses. This circumstance should mute
the immediate impact of the Bennis decision in those states. In states such
as Michigan, however, the Bennis decision gives the green light to law
enforcement officials at all levels to seize first, and ask questions later.
Increased use of forfeiture should worry anyone concerned about civil
liberties. One of the most cherished presumptions in the American legal
system is the presumption that a person is innocent until proven guilty.
Upon a showing of probable cause this presumption is reversed in an in rem
proceeding, requiring the property owner to prove the property's [their?]
innocence.'53 This is even more alarming when one realizes that hearsay

152.
Bennis's
could be
153.

The injustice of this becomes even more shocking if the car seized is not the
1977 Pontiac (valued at $600), but, for example, a late model Ford Explorer that
worth as much as $30,000.
The Second Circuit addressed this issue in 1986:
In almost all cases, once the Government has shown probable cause to
believe that someone has sold drugs and deposited the proceeds of a drug
sale into a bank account, there will be probable cause to believe that the
bank account contains "traceable proceeds" of the sale .... The burden
will then be on the claimant to demonstrate that no portions of the account
...are "traceable proceeds" of the drug sale.
United States v. Banco Cafetero Pan., 797 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (2nd Cir. 1986).
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(e.g., a phone call from an angry neighbor) will support a finding of
probable cause. 54
In the long term, we can expect states and local communities to expand
the number of illegal activities to which asset forfeiture applies. As these
laws are passed there will be no Supreme Court precedent mandating the
inclusion of an innocent owner defense. The financial incentive not to
include such a defense is unlikely to be overruled by any sense of justice,
if Michigan's attitude is any guide. In fact, barring any state constitutional
limits, the Bennis decision is likely to entice cash hungry local communities
to pass forfeiture laws to fund their law enforcement efforts."' One
wonders if the Supreme Court will reconsider its decision when forfeiture
becomes the punishment of choice for illegally parked cars.
V. CONCLUSION

Asset forfeiture is a law enforcement tool best suited for use in the area
from which it emerged. The use of forfeiture in areas outside of its historical
boundaries is both unnecessary and dangerous. Law enforcement agencies
tend to favor forfeiture because its use is convenient and expedient. Expedience, however, has never been known as the great protector of civil liberties.
The Supreme Court's decision in Bennis v. Michigan failed to acknowledge the reasons why forfeiture emerged in the areas of admiralty and
revenue collection. This failure led the Court to improperly analogize those
situations to the Bennis facts. Had the Court ignored this false analogy and
engaged in a substantive due process analysis it would have concluded that
forfeiting the property of an innocent owner is unconstitutional.
In an era of tight budgets, many state and local governments will find
the revenue enhancing aspects of forfeiture to be quite appealing. The
removal of a culpability requirement can only add to its appeal and will likely
lead to egregious abuses. The failure of the Bennis Court to recognize these
dangers and sanction the removal of a culpability requirement will lead to an
increased use of forfeiture by law enforcement agencies and an attendant loss
of civil liberties.
RONALD F. LABEDZ

154. "Hearsay is admissible to support the finding of probable cause." United States
v. All Funds on Deposit in Any Accounts Maintained at Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, 801 F. Supp. 984, 990 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
155. One town has personalized the forfeiture incentive. In Helper, Utah, police officers
are awarded 10 to 25 percent of the drug properties they seize. The Mayor of Helper explains,
"Why not give our guys a reason to be more aggressive?" LEVY, supra note 2, at ix.

